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NOTES
Share Tax, Franchise Tax and Federal Bonds-the Schuylkill Trust
Co. Case
To advocates of federal supremacy, clinging to the pillars of TVA amid
the wreckage of other New Deal legislation, the recent decision in Schuylkill
Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania" may bring further assurance that the Nine Justices
have not altogether forgotten them. In that case, the United States Supreme
Court held invalid an application of a state tax statute on the basic ground that
it was an undue interference with the national sovereignty. Eloquent of the
Court's zeal was the silence from the administrative department. The executive was not sufficiently interested to intervene or to become amicus curae, thereby
preserving the traditional policy of indifference towards such alleged encroachment. If the nation was threatened, only the Supreme Court was aware of the
fact. That is, six members of the court were, these, paradoxically enough, being
the "conservatives"--Chief Justice Hughes, and Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler and Roberts. The three "liberals"-Justices Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo-were oblivious to the danger.
A consideration of the issues in the Schuylkill Trust Co. case must begin
by setting the statute involved in its proper background of legislative history.
For some years, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has imposed upon domestic
corporations, with certain specified exceptions, 2 a "capital stock tax." 3 Since
the tax is levied on corporate assets, it is necessary in applying it to allow deduction for the value of federal securities held by the taxpayer.4 Also deducted,
to avoid double taxation or to promote the policy of exemption, are shares held
in corporations which are subject to, or relieved from, the tax.5 In 19o7, trust
companies were removed from the operation of this statute and placed under
another. The latter act in terms levied a tax upon the shares rather than the
capital stock. Its amount was five mills per dollar of share value, such value to be
determined by adding the value of capital stock paid in, surplus and undivided
profits, and dividing the total by the number of outstanding shares. In short, and
without recourse to the statute's periphrasis, the value of each share was determined by reference to the net assets of the company. The collective tax on all
the shares was payable in the first instance by the company, which had the option
of paying from its funds or collecting from the shareholder. Further to preserve
the appearance of a tax against the shareholders, officers of the corporation were
required to give notice to shareholders of the assessed value of their shares by
I. 296 U. S. 113 (1935).
These include laundering, meat processing and manufacturing associations insofar as
their capital stock is invested in property "strictly incident or appurtenant to the business."
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 72, § 1892. These associations, however, are "temporarily" made subject to the tax for the years 1935 and 1936. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
1936) tit. 72, § 1892.
3. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 72, § 1871. The term "corporation" is employed
herein for the sake of convenience. The Pennsylvania statute applies to joint stock companies
and limited partnerships as well.
4- Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 5 Pa. C. C. gon. (Sup. Ct. 1884). That a
tax on capital stock is invalid unless the value of federal securities is deducted has been held
in Bank of Commerce v. New York, 2 Black 62o (U. S. 1862) ; Bank Tax Case, 2 Wall. 200
(U. S. i865); Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 2o5 U. S. 503 (907).
5. Commonwealth v. Fall Brook Coal Co., 156 Pa. 488, 26 Atl. io7i (893) ; Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania R. R., 297 Pa. 308, 147 Atl. 242 (1929) ; Commonwealth v. Eastern
Securities Co., 309 Pa. 44, 163 Atl. 157 (932).
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posting the valuation in the company's place of business, and it was made the duty
of the state administrative official "to hear any shareholder upon the subject of
valuation." 6
Relying on the terms of the statute and on the state court's construction
of the tax as one on shares rather than on corporate assets, 7 the assessing authorities did not, in valuing the shares, make allowance for federal securities held
by the trust companies. Neither did they deduct shares held by the companies
in associations subject to or relieved from payment of the capital stock tax.
Thereupon, in order to eliminate the objectionable features of economically
double taxation in the one case, and, in the other, of taxation affecting pursuits
elsewhere declared exempt under state policy, the legislature amended the act
so as to provide that there be deducted from the base of valuation so much
thereof as could be attributed to investment "in the shares of stock of corporations liable to pay to the Commonwealth a capital stock tax or a tax on shares,
or relieved from the payment of capital stock tax or tax on shares." 8
Accordingly, in applying the amended act against the Schuylkill Trust Company, such deductions were made in evaluating the shares. Federal securities,
however, were as before included in the valuation base. From this settlement
by the Department of Revenue the Trust Company appealed to the courts; it
wished to be allowed to deduct the value of the federal bonds. It more or less
conceded that no such deduction had been necessary under the unamended act.
But, it contended, the amendment permitting other deductions made this additional one necessary. Because it had been given two favors, the grant of a
third was de rigeur, even though originally it had been justly, or at least legally,
denied any.
The apparent ingratitude of this claim was equalled only by its apparent
incaution. If the Trust Company was right, there were two ways of quieting
it. One was to give it the third favor; the other was to take away the first two.
Nor was the more drastic treatment available only to the legislature. There was
always the possibility that the courts themselves would find that only the amendment was invalid, and that the statute should be applied as if unamended, in all
its onerous perfection.
I
The initial premise is that federal bonds and the income therefrom are
immune from state taxation.' 0

This rule is supported alternatively on two

grounds: first, that the bonds are a governmental instrumentality,1l and as such
immune under M'Culloch v. Maryland;12 secondly, that to permit such taxation
would allow a potentially dangerous interference with the federal borrowing
power.'3 Ordinarily, however, the Court does not purport to inquire whether
6. Pa. Laws 19o7, no. 512, p. 642.
7. Commonwealth v. Mortgage Trust Co., 227 Pa. 163, 76 Atl. 5 (igog).
8. For the share tax statute, amended as indicated, and amended as well in particulars
not important here, see PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 72, §§ 1991, 2OO.
9. It also sought to deduct the value of shares in national banks held by the Trust Company, and which had already been taxed to it under an independent tax. Both the majority
and dissenting Justices agreed that deduction of these shares was necessary under the statute
regulating the taxation of national bank shares, 42 STAT. 1499 (1933), 12 U. S. C. A. § 548
(Supp. i935), and on the authority of Bank of California v. Richardson, 248 U. S. 476
(191g).
io. Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1829); cf. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 (895) (federal government may not tax income from state securi-

ties).

ii. See, e. g., Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 466-469 (U. S. 1829) ; Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594, 6o4 (U. S. 1867).
12. 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. I8ig).
13. See Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, 465 (U. S. 1829); Society for Savings v.
Coite, 6 Wall. 594, 604 (U. S. 1867) ; Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U. S. 620, 624
(1929).
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the state tax questioned affects the instrumentality or impairs the borrowing
power. Instead, its ostensible approach is to determine what subject is "in fact"
being taxed. If the tax is in the form of a property or income tax levied on
the bonds, it is invalid. But if the Court finds it to be on some other subject,
it may be valid even though in operation it equally affects the instrumentality or
the borrowing power.1 4 In accordance with this general approach there has
developed the doctrine that if the tax is on a taxable subject, it may be measured
by non-taxable property or income.15 This doctrine cuts across whole fields of
taxation, both state and federal, and its vicissitudes in some applications do not
resemble those in others.-6 But for such inconsistency, disturbing to various
minds, there exists a priori justification. The doctrine is a subsidiary one, the
principal doctrine in each instance being the immunity of interests affected.
Realistically, use of the subsidiary technic is almost invariably an inroad on the
immunity. As to certain types of interests it may be economically sound to permit such inroads freely; as to other types, the contrary may be true. If the principal doctrine of immunity is regrettable, but too well precedented to be junked
unremorsefully, its consequences can be softened or evaded by employing the
subsidiary doctrine; meantime the judicial cabalism remains intact."

It follows that application of the subsidiary doctrine in its individual fields
of immunity requires individual investigation, although analogies drawn from
its course in other fields may frequently be illuminating. For present purposes
it will suffice to deal with two of its applications. These are (i) the rule that
a tax levied on shares may be measured by the value of corporate assets, without being regarded as a tax on those assets for the purpose of exemption of
federal securities; (2) the rule that a tax levied on a corporate franchise may
14. Cf. Moody, J., in Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines, 205 U. S. 503, 519 (1907):

"The question here is one of power, and not of economics. If the State has not the power to
levy this tax, we will not inquire whether another tax, which it might lawfully impose, would
have the same ultimate incidence." See T. R. Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal
Authority by the Taxing Powers of the States (1918) 31 HAzv. L. Rxv. 32', 333; and cf.
note 15, infra.
15. "The validity of the tax can in no way be dependent upon the mode which the State
may deem fit to adopt in fixing the amount for any year which it will exact for the franchise.
No constitutional objection lies in the way of a legislative body prescribing any mode of measurement to determine the amount it will charge for the privileges it bestows." Home Ins.
Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. 5o3, 6oo (189o). Cf. United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625
(1896) (state inheritance tax validly applies to bequest to federal governments since the tax
is on the privilege of transmittal, being merely measured by the value of the property);
Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115 (1900) (state inheritance tax valid as applied to federal
securities) ; see generally Elcanon Isaacs, The Subject and Measure of Taxation (1926) 26
Co. L. REv. 939; Powell, The Macallen Case-and Before (193o) 8 NAT. I.,comE TAx
MAG. 47; The Macallen Case-and Beyond (930)
8 id. 114; Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 948.
16. Attention is directed to the New York corporate franchise statute, CoNs. LAWS
(Cahill, 193o) c. 61, §§ 208 et seq., which is to be regarded as a tax on income as to one aspect
of taxing foreign corporations with respect to total assets, People v. Knapp, 23o N. Y. 48,
129 N. E. 202 (I92O), but is a franchise tax measured by income as to another aspect of the
same problem, Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm., 266 U. S. 471 (924), and
as to taxing net corporate income including income from federal bonds. People ex rel. Northern Finance Corp. v. Lynch, 290 U. S. 6oi (I933), aff'g 262 N. Y. 477, 188 N. E. 27 (0933),
aff'g 237 App. Div. 862, 261 N. Y. Supp. 969 (3d Dep't 1932).
17. Cf. Powell, Indirect Encroachnent on Federal Authority by the States VIII (1919)
32 HAxv. L. REv. 9o2, 926; Powell, supra note I5, passim.
Since this Note went to the printers, there has appeared an article dealing with the subject and measure technic as used to define immunity from extra-territorial taxation. Lowndes, Rate and Measure in Jurisdictionto Tax-Afternuath of Maxwell v. Bugbee (1936) 49
HARv. L. REv. 756. Professor Lowndes makes the point that the Supreme Court is, while
seeking to curb double taxation, attempting to put the "multistate" taxpayer on an equality
with the "unistate" taxpayer so far as subjection to progressive taxation is concerned. In
this endeavor it is aided by the subject-measure device. Id. at 766-768.
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be measured by corporate assets or income, without being regarded as a tax on
such assets or income for the purpose of exemption of federal securities. The
economic unity underlying these two rules, and furnishing the justification for
considering them together, lies in the fact that they both supply devices which
the taxing power may use to reach, at least indirectly, (a) federal securities,
which are (b) held by corporations.
The notion of a tax on shares as separate and distinct from a tax levied
against the association stems from Van Allen v. The Assessors.18 In that historic case, the Court ruled that a tax on shares in a national bank whose assets
consisted solely of federal securities was not to be considered a tax on the securities themselves. The tax involved was on the par value of the shares and was
collectible directly from the individual shareholders. In National Bank v. Commonwealth, 0 however, a tax was held to be a levy against the shareholders, and
therefore valid without allowing deduction for federal bonds held by the
bank, even though it was collectible in the first instance from the bank with
penalties attaching to the bank on failure to remit payment. Collection from
the bank was regarded as being merely a common and convenient practice of
drawing from the source. The fact that the tax was on the par value was cited
as an indication, along with the terminology of the statute, of a tax on shares
rather than on capital value.
In Cleveland Trust Co. v. Lander,20 the authority of the National Bank
case was extended, for the first time, to upholding a like statute as applied to
a state bank. Five years later, the first rebuff came in Home Savings Bank
v. Des Moines,21 where the Court, while reaffirming the doctrine in terms, went
to no great pains to apply it in fact. A state bank had protested a tax which
as applied did not allow deduction for federal securities. The state argued that
the tax was on the shares, merely being collectible from the bank. Mr. Justice
Moody granted the contention that if the tax were on the shares it could not be
successfully attacked. However, it was necessary to "ascertain with precision
the nature of the tax in controversy, and upon what property it was levied." 22
"We must inquire," he said, "whether the law really imposes a tax upon the
shares of stock as the property of their owners, or merely adopts the value of
these shares as the measure of valuation of the property of the corporation, and
by that standard taxes that property itself." 23 The first step taken toward
ascertaining the true nature of the tax was to scrutinize the wording of the
statute. That, while naming the shares as the subject of taxation, stated that
they were assessed to the corporation. Furthermore, while collection of the
tax from the corporation did not in itself demonstrate that the tax was not on
the shares, nevertheless, by construing state law (in a somewhat unnecessary
fashion), the Court concluded that the state had deprived the corporation of
the right over against the shareholder, which ordinarily would exist "under the
general principle of law that one who pays the debt of another at his request
[sic] can recover the amount from him." 24 Also regarded as significant were
the action of the assessor who had first deducted federal bonds from the tax
base before being advised to the contrary, and the fact that the valuation was
to take into account the capital, surplus, and undivided earnings. This method
18. 3 Wall. 573 (U. S. 1865). Accord: People v. The Commissioners, 4 Wall. 244 (U.
S. 1866).
19. 9 Wall. 353 (U. S. 1869). Accord: Peoples Natl Bank of Kingfisher v. Board of
Equalization, 260 U. S. 702 (1922), aff'g 79 Okla. 312, 193 Pac. 622 (1920).
20. 184 U. S. I1 (19o2).
21. 205 U. S. 503 (1907).

22.
23.

Id. at 510.

Ibid.

24. Id. at 518.
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of valuing appeared to the Court to be indicative of a valuation of net corporate
assets.
No such feeling was voiced, however, in Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Fairweather,2 5 where a tax in terms on shares and measured by capital, surplus and
undivided earnings was upheld without the necessity of deducting the value of
federal securities from the base. As Mr. Justice Van Devanter cogently
pointed out, these items were the very ones which primarily determined the
value of the shares. The conclusion is inevitable, then, that the "true nature"
of the tax in Home Savings Bank v. Des Moines was determined not by any
distinction of substance, but only by an accident of statutory verbalism combined with several extremely dubious makeweights. But it is not only the
Supreme Court whose best efforts to distinguish between a tax on corporate
assets and a tax on shares measured by corporate assets and collected from the
corporation may be expected to result in finding little more than a difference in
expression.
In Miller v. Milwaukee,26 the tax had no spurious elements. Since it was
an income tax on dividends received by the shareholder and was collectible directly from him, it was clearly directed at the interest of the shareholder as
distinct from that of the corporation. Consequently, whatever elements of invalidity it contained as regards federal securities held by the corporation would
be doubly fatal if contained in such a tax as that sustained in the Fairweather
case. In the Miller case, the State of Wisconsin levied a tax on corporate income, necessarily exempting from its operation income derived from federal
bonds. In order to prevent economic double taxation, shareholders making
individual returns were permitted to deduct dividends from their gross income.
But not all the dividends were deductible-only a proportion equal to that which
the taxed portion of the corporate income bore to the total corporate income.
To state the proposition affirmatively, the tax was only on dividends representing income from tax-exempt sources. Once the case is put in this fashion, it
becomes easy enough to find arguments against the validity of the statute. It
is inconceivable that the Court, no matter how staunchly and irretrievably
committed it has been or may become to the view of the difference between a tax on the shareholder and a tax on the corporation, will, in the absence
of special cause, uphold a share tax which aims only at the shareholder's
interest represented by federal securities.2 7 The issue in the Miller case
resolves to one of discrimination, whose existence may be asserted because
the tax affected only the interest represented by exempt securities, or, on
the other hand, may be denied because it did so only to equalize the position of
those securities with that of assets taxed to the corporation. The Court
had to decide whether the ill-will shown to the shareholder because of his interest in federal bonds was offset by the benefit accorded to the corporation
because of its interest. It could have pointed out that to allow the setoff was to disregard the separate identity of shareholder and corporation relied
upon to sustain the tax in the first instance. It could have reasoned that a discrimination against the shareholder could not be equalized by a benefit to the
corporation when that benefit was enjoyed as a matter of right. On the other
hand, it might have said that a tax on dividends was concededly valid unless
25. 263 U. S. 103 (1923).
26. 272 U. S. 713 (1927).

27. Cf. Missouri ex reL. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gebner, 281 U. S. 313 (1930) (deduction
allowed by state to taxpayers generally, but diminished pro tanto by value of tax-exempt
securities, is invalid as discriminating against exempt bonds); National Life Ins. Co. v.
United States, 277 U. S. 508 (1928) (similar holding as to federal income tax with analogous
deduction).
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discriminatory, and that it was not discriminatory to equalize, or to treat differently assets differently situated. 28 Where there was so much to say on both sides,
it is unfortunate that the majority's part was spoken so obscurely. The prevailing number of the Court held the tax invalid. Mr. Justice Brandeis, with
Mr. Justice Stone, concurred on special grounds, 29 but dissented vigorously from
the proposition that in the absence of those grounds the statute was unconstitutional. Mr. Justice Holmes stated the majority's position:
"There is no doubt that in general a corporation is a nonconductor
that cuts off connection between dividends to its stockholders and the corporate funds from which the dividends are paid. .

.

. A system of taxa-

tion that applied to stockholders of all corporations equally might tax, we
assume for purposes of argument, the stockholders of a corporation that
had invested all its property in United States bonds. But it would be a
different matter if the State selected such corporations, supposing a number of them to exist, and taxed their stockholders alone. It is a familiar
principle that conduct which in usual situations the law protects may become unlawful when part of a scheme to reach a prohibited result. If the
avowed purpose or self-evident operation of a statute is to follow the bonds
of the United States and to make up for its inability to reach them directly
by indirectly achieving the same result, the statute must fail even if but for
its purpose or special operation it would be perfectly good. Under the laws
of Wisconsin the income from the United States bonds may not be the only
item exempted from the income tax on corporations, but it certainly is the
most conspicuous instance of exemption at the present time. A result intelligently foreseen and offering the most obvious motive for an act that will
bring it about, fairly may be taken to have been a purpose of the act. On
that assumption the immunity of the national bonds is too important to allow
any narrowing beyond what the Acts of Congress permit. We think it
would be going too far to say that they allow an intentional interference
that is only prevented from being direct by the artificial distinction between
a corporation and its members. A tax may very well be upheld as against
any casual effect it may have upon the bonds of the United States when
passed with a different intent and not aimed at them, but it becomes a more
serious attack upon their immunity when they are its obvious aim. In such
a ease the Court must consider the public welfare rather than the artifices
contrived for private convenience and must look at the facts." 30
This language begins with the topic of discrimination and ends with the topic of
legislative intent. Some connection seems intended however, and the following
may be offered as a fair paraphrase: the tax is bad because it is discriminatory,
and it is discriminatory because it deliberately seeks to reach United States bonds.
That discrimination was the ultimate issue in the Court's mind appears also
from Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion.31 Now the fallaciousness of
the passage so interpreted is self-evident. The test for discrimination should be
the statute's effect and operation. To hunt for the fugitive intention of the
28. Cf. Brandeis, J., dissenting, National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U. S. 508,
530, cited suPra note 27. See R. C. Brown, Reduction of Tax Exenmptions by Reason of
Receipt of Tax-Exempt Income (1932) 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. 534, 544 et seq.
29. Namely, that the dividends were designated to come specifically from interest on war
bonds, thereby violating a Congressional exemption act. 40 STAT. 37 (1917), 31 U. S. C. A.
755 (927).
30. Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U. S. 713, 714, 715 (1927).
31. The passage registering disagreement with the majority's view begins, "I do not

think it can properly be said that the state statute discriminates against Government bonds."
Id. at 716.
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legislature is as irrelevant as it is indiscreet, the indiscretion consisting of failure
to foresee the danger that the test of legislative purpose might be divorced from
the particular situation and applied in cases where discrimination could not be
involved in any analysis of the facts.
II

The franchise tax doctrine originated in three decisions rendered at one
term. Two of these involved in lieu taxes requiring savings banks to pay a sum
equal to a stated percent of the total amount of deposits. The banks objected
on the ground that no allowance was made for those deposits which were invested in United States bonds. To this the Court replied that the tax was not
on the deposits or on corporate assets; it was an excise tax exacted for the privilege of doing business in corporate form.32 The amount of deposits was included in the statute "not as the subject-matter for assessment, but as the basis
for computing the tax required to be paid by the corporate defendants." 38 Since
the tax varied with the amount of deposits, rather than with their value or the
value of their proceeds, it was not, in the Court's view, a property tax, which
is normally associated with a true valuation of assets. In the third case, corporations were required to pay a tax based on the excess of the market value of
capital stock over the combined value of real estate and machinery. The Court
held that it was not necessary to deduct federal bonds from the taxable capital
excess. The tax, it stated, was an excise; it had been so construed by the state
courts under the state constitution, and its amount varied with market value
rather than with actual, assessed value.34
It appears, then, that in all three of these decisions the chief test applied by
Mr. Justice Clifford, the author of the majority opinions, was whether the tax
was on an assessed true valuation of corporate property. If it was based on
something other than true value it was not a property tax, but an excise. This
test does not appear to have been employed in any later cases, where the statutes
having been drafted as excises the Court felt no need to look at the method of
determining the taxed amount. Thus in the leading case of Home Ins. Co. v.
New York,3 5 the statute explicitly purported to be a franchise tax measured by
the value of the capital stock, the rate applied to the measure varying with the
amount of dividends. The Court held that federal securities were not unconstitutionally included in the measure, although it granted that a capital stock tax
would have to permit their deduction. A similar freedom was subsequently
extended to the federal tax power in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,36 which held that
a federal excise tax on corporations, measured by net corporate income including
income derived from state securities, did not infringe the prohibition against
federal taxation of income from state bonds.
If the distinction between certain share taxes and direct taxes on corporate assets is elusive, that between a franchise tax measured by capital or income
and a tax on the capital or income is completely illusory.3 7 Pronouncements to
32.

Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594 (U. S. 1867); Provident Institution v.

Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 611 (U. S.1867).

33. Society for Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594, 6o8 (U. S.1867).
34. Hamilton Co. v. Massachusetts, 6 Wall. 632 (1867).
35. 134 U. S.594 (189o). Judgment in this case was originally affirmed, without opinion, by a divided court, Mr. Justice Woods not participating because of illness. ii U. S.
129 (I886).
On motion, the case was subsequently restored to the docket to be heard by a
full bench. 122 U. S.636 (1887).

36.

220 U. S. 107 (1911).

37. Professor Thomas Reed Powell states the proposition in his customary trenchant
form: "The difference between a tax on the capital of a corporation and a tax on its franchise measured by its capital is one between tweedledum and tweedledee. Since taxes on a

NO TES

the contrary 8 can hardly be regarded seriously. Nevertheless, it was years
before the doctrine ran other than a smooth course. In Northwestern Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin,88 the Supreme Court for the first time limited the
rule by holding that it did not permit the excise to be measured by gross income
without deducting for income from federal bonds. Mr. Justice McReynolds had
the advantage of stating a simple rule, but any attempt to deduce a rationale
from his opinion is apt to prove baffling. The technic employed is reminiscent
of Mr. Justice Moody's in the already discussed case of Home Savings Bank v.
Des Moines. While the distinction between a franchise tax measured by income
and a direct income tax was conceded, the Court stated that it must penetrate to
the true nature of the statute in order to determine in which category it belonged.
Mr. Justice McReynolds' reasoning then proceeded as follows: the tax considered, while cast in the verbal form of a franchise tax, was measured by gross
income; a franchise tax may be measured by net income; since gross income
differs from net, the tax was not a franchise tax but a direct tax on income. As
authority for differentiating between gross and net income, the Court cited a
case which permitted taxation of the net receipts from interstate commerce, at
the same time granting the invalidity of a tax on gross receipts. 40 The precedent
is not persuasive. The principle restricting state taxation of interstate commerce
is that the state may not unduly burden such commerce. Since a tax on gross
income, varying as it does with volume rather than with profit, is a more substantial and direct burden than a tax on net, it was quite within reason to deny
the one and sustain the other. But the flexible "burdening" principle has no
application to taxation of state or federal instrumentalities. Their immunity is
complete, with net income being as untaxable as gross. And if an excise measured by immune net does not infringe the
4 1 immunity, it is difficult to see why an
excise measured by immune gross does.
42
With the advent some two years later of Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts,
the franchise tax doctrine seemed to have gone by the boards altogether. In that
case, the Court, splitting six-three, held invalid a Massachusetts franchise tax
measured by net income because of its failure to make allowance for income from
federal bonds; insofar as it failed to accord like consideration to income from
state securities issued as tax-free, the statute was held invalid as impairing the
obligations of contracts. The opinion, written by Mr. Justice Sutherland, did
not, however, purport to overrule Home Ins. Co. v. New York or the reciprocal
case of Flint v.Stone Tracy Co, although it did describe the latter as an "extreme example" 48 of the franchise tax doctrine. The Macallen case was discorporation are in last analysis taxes on the interest of the shareholders in the corporate
assets or business, to exclude federal securities from the computation of a tax on the corporate capital and to include them in the assessment of shares of stock is to allow the state
to reach with one hand what it is forbidden to touch with the other." Powell, supra note 17,
at 914, 915.
38. As that of Mr. Justice Stone in Pacific Co., Ltd. v. Johnson, 285 U. S. 480, 490
(1932) : "The distinction is one of substance, not of form...
39. 275 U. S.136 (1927).
40. United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918). A state may not tax
gross receipts from interstate commerce. Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. v.
Texas, 21 OU.S. 217 (19o8) ; Crew Levick Co. v. Pa., 245 U. S. 292 (1917). Otherwise as
to an in lieu tax on gross receipts. United States Express Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S.335
(1912).
See R. C. Brown, Restrictions on. State Taxation Because of Interference with
Federal Functions (ig3i) 17 VA. L. REv. 325, 330-332.
41. See Brown, supra note 4o, at 336; Powell, The Macallen Case-and Before (930)
8 NAT. INcomE TAx MAO. 47.
42. 279 U. S. 62o (929), petition for rehearing denied, 280 U. S. 513 (929).
43. Id. at 628.
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tinguished from these on the ground that the Massachusetts legislature had shown
an intent to reach income from tax-exempt securities, thereby doing indirectly
what it was forbidden to do directly. This intention was found from the circumstance that the statute, which had originally exempted such income, had been
amended to remove the exemption, and also from the language of a committee
report to the legislature. As justification for the reliance on legislative motive,
the majority cited Miller v. Milwaukee. The impropriety of generalizing the language of that case beyond a situation of potential discrimination has already been
indicated. In addition to this weakness in precedent, however, the rationale
advanced in the Macallen case is on its own merits ludicrously inadequate,
amounting, as it does, to saying that the state possesses a power but must
exercise it only unconsciously."
The palpable weakness of the ratio decidendi of the Macallen case, together
with some of its far flung language, led critical authority to assume that for
better or for worse the whole franchise tax doctrine had been overruled. 45 The
Court's attempt to preserve the Home Ins. Co. and Stone Tracy cases was regarded simply as an instance of deplorable, but not altogether unknown, judicial
tergiversation. This lack of candor, if such it was, called forth its own retribution, however, after changes in the Court's personnel had reduced the Macallen
majority from six to four. For in Educational Films Corp. v. Ward,46 a majority revived the franchise tax rule, seizing on the "motive" reasoning of the
Macallen case as affording a distinguishing feature. In the Ward case the tax,
which was measured by net income irrespective of source, was challenged as
applied to income derived from federal copyrights. Mr. Justice Stone's opinion, however, left it clear that the holding was equally applicable to all exempt
income, including that from federal bonds. Home Ins. Co. v. New York and
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. were cited with approval. Three justices objected that
the legislative history of the statute showed it was intentionally aimed at income
from tax-exempt bonds, and that consequently it fell within the spirit of the
Macallen ban.
The Macallen case was further restricted to its immediate facts in Pacific
Co., Ltd. v. Johnson.4 Here a franchise tax, measured by net income, was
assailed as impairing the validity of contracts by taxing state bonds issued as
tax-free. The majority sustained the tax. Justice Sutherland, for himself and
two other justices, dying hard, dissented on the grounds that a report of the
state tax commission and testimony at a legislative hearing showed the intent
of the legislature to reach the exempt income. Justice Stone, however, limited
the Macallen case to a reversal of policy in recalling an exemption. Miller v.
Milwaukee was regarded in its true light as involving only a question of discrimination.
That the rule of the Pacific Co. case applies to federal bonds as well as to
tax-free state bonds appears not only from the language of the opinion and the
precedent referred to, but also from a later memorandum opinion, 48 in which
that case was cited as the only authority in sustaining the New York franchise
tax including in its measure the value of federal securities. The amazing fea44. See Brown, supra note 4o, at 342, 343.
45. Brown, supra note 4o, at 343, 344; Powell, The Macallen Case--and Beyond (193o)

8 NAT. I4rcOmE TAX MAG. 91, passim.
46. 282 U. S. 379 (93). See Powell, An Imaginary Judicial Opinion (i93I) 44 HARV.
L. REv. 889.
47. 285 U. S. 480 (1932).
48. People ex rel. Northern Finance Corp. v. Lynch, 290 U. S. 6ox (1933), aff'g 262
N. Y. 477, 188 N. E. 27 (1933) (a memorandum opinion), aff'g 237 App. Div. 862, 261 N. Y.
Supp. 969 (3d Dep't 1932) (also a memorandum opinion).
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ture of the memorandum opinion lies in the
fact that it reaches a result contrary
49
to the Macallen case on identical facts.
III

There remains to be considered the additions made by the Schuylkill Trust
Co. case to the body of law already described. Counsel for the complaining taxpayer advanced an argument harking back to the "true nature" stands taken, as
earlier described, by Justices Moody and McReynolds. While granting the
validity of the general share-tax doctrine, he contended that by its true nature
the tax was on the property of the corporation instead of on the shares. Why?
Because the deductions granted from the net assets which were the measure of
the tax prevented the tax from being on the share value; since the tax was not
measured by the value of each shareholder's interest, it was not a tax on his
interest at all. 0 Counsel for the Commonwealth quite properly replied that such
deductions from the measure had not previously prevented taxes from being
regarded as share taxes, 51 and he might have added that there was nothing to
prevent the tax from being on part of the shareholder's interest. Mr. Justice
Roberts, speaking for the majority in holding the tax invalid, refused to consider the "true nature" argument. He said:
"It is clear that the tax is not measured by each shareholder's aliquot
proportion of all the assets of the company.

.

.

.

The appellant says this

demonstrates that the tax is one upon assets. If the appellant is right, the
exaction operates as a discrimination against Government securities and
other assets exempt under federal law. Missouri v. Gehner, 281 U. S. 313.
If the tax is one truly upon that independent property evidenced by the
ownership of a share of corporate stock its collection does not discriminate
against United States securities.
"We think that the issue of discrimination is not to be resolved by a
choice between the two contentions as to the nature of the tax. The point
is that the State has chosen a portion only of the net assets of the corporation as a measure of the tax, whether the exaction be from the company
or its shareholders. The State has exempted certain assets on the theory
that to measure the tax in part by their value would in effect be to tax
them twice. If to measure the shareholder's tax by inclusion of these taxed
or exempted securities found amongst the company's assets would be to
tax the shareholder in virtue of the company's ownership of those securities, it seems clear that to refuse to exempt United States securities from
the measure of the tax is to lay a tax reckoned upon their value. To put it
otherwise, if to exclude securities already taxed or exempted from tax pursuant to the policy of the Commonwealth avoids double taxation, to include
49. See (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 480, 481. The New York statute had been previously
sustained as applied to royalties from federal copyright. Educational Films Corp. v. Ward,
282 U. S. 379 (1931), cited supra note 46. In that case the minority argued that the statute
had been originally construed not to apply to interest from state and federal bonds, People
ex rel. Standard Oil Co. v. Law, 237 N. Y. 142, 142 N. E. 446 (1923), and that having been
amended to reach such income by N. Y. Laws 1924, c. 329; N. Y. Laws 1927, c. 479, the
statute ran afoul of the Macallen case. 282 U. S. at 395. To this the majority replied that
the Macallen case had no bearing insofar as income from copyrightg "were concerned, since
the statute had been broad enough to include such income before the amendment. 295 U. S.
at 393, 394.
5o. See Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U. S. 113, 119 (1935) ; Brief for Appellant 41, 42, Commonwealth v. Schuylkill Trust Co., 315 Pa. 429, 173 Atl. 309 (1934).
51. Supplemental Brief for Appellee ii, Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U. S.
113 (1935), citing Commercial Bank v. Chambers, 182 U. S. 556 (ioi)
; Amoskeag Savings
Bank v. Purdy, 231 U. S. 373 (1913); Bank of California v. Richardson, 248 U. S. 476
(19,9).
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United States securities in the measure of the tax seems inevitably to increase the burden of the tax by reason of their ownership." 52
This passage, not a very lucid one, seems to be based on the following reasoning:
(i) the inclusion of federal bonds in the measure burdens the bonds; (2) this
is demonstrated by the fact that the legislature thought it would relieve assets
already taxed once from a burden equivalent to a second taxation by removing
them from the measure; (3) to lift the burden from certain assets without lifting it from the federal bonds is discriminating against the latter. The extract
may also seem to state that by its true nature the tax is one on corporate assets,
the true nature being shown by the legislative desire to do away with a second
taxation of assets already taxed. But in that case, there would have been no
need for any references to discrimination, and furthermore, there is an express
disclaimer of any attempt to find the nature of the tax.
Mr. justice Cardozo presented the position of the minority with his usual
dexterity. The tax was a share tax. The purpose of the exemption was to
avoid "double taxation or something akin thereto",53 and it was not illegally discriminating against government bonds to carry out such a justifiable policy. The
bonds were in no worse position than "vast classes of securities."

54

The test

was whether the discrimination was "so marked as to justify the inference that
it was unfriendly in design . . . at the very least it must favor forms of in-

vestment that are in substantial competition with Government securities." 55 An
analogy existed in decisions on taxation of national bank shares. Such shares
could not be taxed at a greater rate than other moneyed capital competing with
was not overstepped
national banks; 6 yet this limitation against discrimination
57
merely because the state permitted certain exemptions.
Assessing the Schuylkill Trust Co. case against the background of precedent,
it appears to represent one step in advance of Miller v. Milwaukee towards
Macallen v. Massachusetts. In it, as in the Miller case, the fundamental question
was whether discrimination against federal bonds existed when the share tax

excluded from its operation the interest of the shareholders represented by
securities which had already been taxed to the corporation, but included the
interest represented by federal bonds. In both cases the majority deduced discrimination from the intention of the legislature rather than from the actual
operation of the statute. But where Justice Holmes found this from the intent
of the legislature to reach federal bonds, justice Roberts, precluded from doing
likewise by the obvious legislative purpose manifested by a process of amendment, found it from the intent of the legislature to remove assets directly taxed
from a second taxation, coupled with its failure to remove federal bonds from
an initial taxation."8
52.
53.
54.
55.

Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U. S. 113, 119, 120 (1935).
Id. at 125.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 13o.

56. "In the case of a tax on [national bank]: shares the tax imposed shall not be at a
greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of the individual citizens of such State coming into competition with the business of national banks. . . 2' 42
STAT. 1499 (1923), 12 U. S. C. A. § 548 (1927).

57. Citing inter alia Hepburn v. The School Directors, 23 Wall. 480 (U. S. 1874);
Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S. 19 (1877); Mercantile Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138
(1887).
58. It is true, of course, that the mechanics of the two cases differ in that the discrimination in the Miller case consisted in including only tax-free assets in the income taxed,
while in the Schuylkill case it consisted in excluding assets already taxed from the measure.
In addition, the discrimination in the Miller case was more serious, since the tax reached only
the interest of the shareholder in tax-exempt income. But in the Schuylkill case, the measure
of the tax might include other securities besides tax-exempt ones, such as shares held by trust
companies in foreign corporations which paid no tax to Pennsylvania.
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As to one part of the holding, however, it was not necessary for the majority
to go quite so far as in the Miller case. It might have held that the statute was
not discriminatory in allowing deduction for previously taxed assets, but was
discriminatory in allowing deduction for assets previously relieved from tax.
That is, the Court might have required for federal bonds a most favored nation
treatment in the operation of both statutes, rather than a beneficial status.
Neither majority nor minority, however, was willing so to compromise.
IV
Of the cases hitherto discussed, five have provoked dissenting opinions and
have also been decided in recent years. Consequently they throw some light on
the attitude of individual members of the Court as now constituted. A more
thorough survey would include a study of the division on allied cases. Such
cases, it is submitted, properly are those which concern the general principle of
immunity of federal and state instrumentalities from the taxing power of the
other sovereign, whether or not they involve the technic of "tax on, measured
by." Cases which apply that technic, but only to other immunities, should be
regarded as less indicative. Thus cases employing or denying the doctrine
where taxation of interstate commerce or extra-territorial taxation are concerned
are less useful so far as investigation of the present topic goes.
In the cases mentioned, the Chief Justice and Justice Roberts have identical
records, being with the majorities each time in EducationalFilms Corp. v. Ward,
Pacific Co., Ltd. v. Johnson, and Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania. In the
first two of these cases they upheld indirect taxation of exempt assets. In the
third they denied it, but only in a case where discrimination might be said to
exist, and which consequently does not necessarily indicate a change in attitude.
An analogy exists with respect to Justice Holmes, who wrote the majority opinion
in Miller v. Milwaukee, a discrimination case, but who was with the dissenters
in the Macallen case, in which the majority relied on his own earlier misleading
language.
Justices Brandeis and Stone have in every instance supported indirect taxation and have likewise been reluctant to find discrimination. Thus they concurred specially in the Miller case, were with the majority in the Educational
Filins and Pacific Co. cases, and with the minority in the Schuylkill Trust Co.
and Macallen cases. Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland, and Butler have been
just as consistently aligned against Justices Brandeis and Stone. Justice'
Cardozo is definitely on the Brandeis-Stone side, having been with the majority
in the Pacific Co. case and having written the dissent in the Schuylkill case.
Justice McReynolds is the most incalculable factor. He is definitely against
possible discrimination, having been with the majority in Miller v. Milwaukee
and the Schuylkill case. As to his attitude otherwise, however, it is difficult to
reconcile his position with the majority in Macallen v. M1assachusetts with his
stand for the majority holding in the EducationalFilms and Pacific Co. cases.
V
The foregoing gives rise to the following conclusions:
(i) A state may, if it chooses, evade the ban against taxing corporations
on federal bonds or the income therefrom. It may reach the corpus by drafting
its statute (a) in the form of a share tax collectible from the corporation,
measured by net assets or by capital stock, or (b) in the form of a franchise
tax similarly measured. It may reach the income by drafting its statute as a
franchise tax measured by the income. A share tax is not appropriate to reach
the income, since it would seem an uphill fight to convince the Court that a tax
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purporting to reach the shareholder's income might go beyond the dividends
paid to the net income of the corporation. In share taxes there exists also the
danger that they will be ineffective as to that portion of the assets representing
of
the interest of non-resident shareholders, in view of the dubious standing
0
Corry v. Baltimore 59 in the light of First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Maine.6
(2) Granted the existence of the devices in (i), nevertheless the Supreme
Court reserves to itself the right to look at the "true nature" of the statute and
to find, in certain instances, that it imposes a direct tax on corporate assets. So
far as applied to share taxes, this reservation requires careful draftsmanship
of the statute so as to preserve the concept of separate identity of shareholder
and corporation. Thus the tax should be "assessed against the shareholders"
rather than "against the corporation." The state should also avoid any implication that it is denying by statute the corporation's "common-law" right to reimbursement from the shareholders. So far as applied to franchise taxes, the
reservation prevents the state from adopting gross assets instead of net as the
measure of the tax. In what other instances the reservation may apply cannot
fairly be predicted.
(3) Neither share tax nor, presumably, franchise tax may discriminate
against federal securities in fixing the measure of the tax. Discrimination exists
not only in the obvious case when the measure is arbitrarily restricted to exempt
securities, but even when it is so restricted only because the excluded assets have
already been directly taxed. Discrimination also exists when the measure,
while not restricted solely to federal securities, excludes assets subject to or
relieved from direct taxation. Hitherto discrimination has been found by
tortuous reference to legislative motive, although a respectable argunent could
have been made for its existence in fact. Common sense leads to the conclusion
that even in the absence of a two-statute case (one statute levying a "direct" tax,
the other a share or franchise tax), the exclusion of any assets from the
measure will necessitate exclusion of federal bonds as well, since this situation
than where the purpose of the exclusion is only
is more clearly discriminatory
1
to prevent double taxation.6

(4) The doctrine of Macallen v. Massachusetts that anything showing
intent on the part of the legislature to reach tax-exempt assets will invalidate
the tax is overruled under the present state of the decisions, although it may
still apply in the one instance of reversal of tax policy, and is not so expressly
overruled as to prevent future disinterment.
(5) The attitude of an individual justice toward the doctrines of share
taxes and franchise taxes may be supposed to be a reflection of his general
feeling as to the advisability of permitting non-discriminatory state taxation of
federal securities. If, with the economists, he is convinced that the present rule
59. i96 U. S. 466 (igo5) (state of incorporation has jurisdiction to levy a property tax
on shares of non-residents). Cf. Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. i (1914) (state of domicile
may also tax).
60. 284 U. S. 312 (932) (state of incorporation has no jurisdiction to levy an estate tax
on shares of non-residents). The jurisdictional problem was argued in the Schuylkill case,
but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the existence of jurisdiction as to shares of
non-residents on the authority of the Corry case. Commonwealth v. Schuylkill Trust Co.,
The United States Supreme Court refused to
315 Pa. 429, 433, 173 Atl. 309, 310 (I934).
pass on the question saying that the basis of its decision made a discussion of the point unJust how that
necessary. Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U. S. 113, 123 (935).
follows is a mystery in itself.
6i. Justice Cardozo seems so to have interpreted the result of the Schuylkill case, for he
states, "To hold that there was discrimination here in any forbidden sense is to hold that
bonds and notes of the United States must be deducted from the value of the shares if there
is a deduction of any form of investment, no matter how minute in amount or alien in quality."

Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U. S. 113, 129 (i935).
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of exemption is unsound, he will be apt to favor the indirect taxes as sub rosa
means of accomplishing the forbidden. Of the present members of the Supreme
Court, Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts are for the doctrines in general,
while quick to deny application in cases of possible discrimination. Justices
Stone, Brandeis and Cardozo can be depended on to favor the doctrines.
Justices Van Devanter, Sutherland and Butler can be depended on to oppose
the doctrines. Justice McReynolds has not committed himself to any one course.
J.F.
The Presence or Absence of a Strike as a Factor in the Issuance of
Injunctions in Labor Disputes
The judicial developments in labor cases which in large part led to the
recent passage of anti-injunction acts in a number of jurisdictions have engendered considerable emphasis on the meaning of the term "strike". To appreciate
fully the significance of this fact, it is essential that reference be made to the
famous Section 20 of the Clayton Act 1 insofar as it declared that:
"No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of
the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between
an employer and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at
law

..

That this statute, once hopefully styled labor's "Magna Charta",2 lost most
of its supposed force in the course of judicial construction is too well known
to be discussed here. For the purposes of this note it is sufficient to observe a
single technical aspect of this historic treatment, namely the numbing requirement that labor disputants must stand in the "proximate" relation of employer
and employe% before the bar against an injunction can be invoked on behalf of
labor defendants.
In the case of Duplex PrintingPress Co. v. Deering' this construction had
its inception. Here the machinists' union sought to obtain a closed shop agreement, better wages, and shorter hours from the plaintiff company. To this end,
a strike was called in the plaintiff's shop and attempts were made to induce other
employers handling the plaintiff's products to cease doing so. This latter move was
effective enough to lead the plaintiff to seek a comprehensive injunction against
interfering with its business. Although both lower federal courts were of the
opinion that Section 2o prevented the issuance of any injunction, 4 the Supreme
Court reached the opposite conclusion and granted the desired relief. The interesting rationale of this result built heavily upon the determination by the majority of the court that the words "employer and employees", as used in the act,
prevented persons other than employees of the plaintiff from relying on the
Clayton Act's restriction against injunctions.5
This highly technical judicial construction was a powerful force leading to
the passage of the model anti-injunction bill by a number of state legislatures,
38 STAT. 730, 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. A. § 52 (1927).
Gompers, The Charter of IndustrialFreedom (1914) 21 Am. FEDERATIONIST 957, 971.
3. 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
4. 252 Fed. 722 (C. C. A. 2d, I918), aff'g 247 Fed. 192 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
5. 254 U. S. 470 et seq.
I.

2.
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as well as by Congress. 6 Indeed, the committee reports of the latter body show
a clear legislative intent to prevent any recurrence of the above holding. 7 Thus,
it is not surprising that, like its unfortunate predecessor, the model bill also has
been viewed as a Magna Charta of labor,8 although some pessimistic voices
already have been heard to dispute this roseate prognostication. 9
In the recent case of Safeway Stores Inc. v. Retail Clerks' Union,10 however, the Supreme Court of Washington cast grave doubts upon the success of
this latest attempt to confine the judiciary within the limits of statutory language.
Here the defendant labor group, seeking a union agreement from the plaintiff
employer, commenced picketing for that purpose. In dismissing the employer's
bill for an injunction against such activity, the lower court deemed the case a
labor dispute within the meaning of the model anti-injunction bill as passed by
the Washington legislature in 1933. Like its counterpart in a considerable number of other jurisdictions,1 ' this law defines a labor dispute as:
"any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association, or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee." 12
By a process of reasoning not clearly ascertainable from the opinion, the upper
court found that there was no "labor dispute" and accordingly issued an injunction on behalf of the employer. As has been recognized in a number of federal
decisions, 3 this statute obviously should eliminate any requirement that the
disputants include employees of the complaining employer. Yet, through unfamiliarity with the terms and historical background of the statute perhaps, the
court reached its conclusion in the following language:
"It [the dispute] in no way pertains to the relation between the appellant,
On the contrary, this is a lawsuit bea merchant, and its employees. . .
6. In fact, with regard to this legislation it has been generally concluded that: "The interpretation given to the Clayton Act by the Duplex case, to the effect that the privileges of
that act may be invoked only in a dispute between an employer and his employees, is thus rendered innocuous." FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION (1930) 216. See
Note (932) 30 MicH. L. REv. 1257, 1264-1268.
7. SEN. REP. No. 163, 72d Cong., ist Sess., Ser. No. 9487 (1932)1 25; H. R. REP. No.
669, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., Ser. No. 9492 (1932) 8.
8. GOLDBERG AND LEVENSON, LAwLEss JUDGES (935) 83.
9.Cf.: "Judging from past experience of labor with the courts there seems little hope
that labor will receive the benefits which were intended by this new law. If the legislation is
ultimately held constitutional we may expect the courts to interpret the language so that
labor will have gained very little." Id. at 85.
10. 5, P. (2d) 372 (Wash. 1935).

Two judges dissented.

ii. Bills similar to the here relevant sections of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction
Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. ioI-II5 (Supp. 1934), have been passed in at least
fifteen states: Colo. Laws 1933, c. 59; Idaho Laws 1933, c. 215; IND. STAT. (Baldwin 1934)
§§ IoI55-ioi68; La. Acts 1934, No. 203; Md. Laws 1935, c. 574; Mass. Acts 2935, c. 407;
Minn. Laws 1933, c. 416; N. Y. Laws 2935, c. 477, anwndindg Crv. PRAc. AcT by adding
§ 876-a; N. D. Laws 1935, c. 247; Ore. Laws 1933, c. 355; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp.
1935) tit. 43, §§ 2o2-2o4; Utah Laws 1933, c. 25; Wash. Laws 1933 (Ex. Sess.) c. 7; Wis.
Laws 1931, c. 376; Wyo. Laws 1933, c. 37. That all these statutes will be held constitutional
may be doubted. In re Opinion of the Justices, 275 Mass. 580, 276 N. E. 649 (I932) ; In re
Opinion of the Justices, 86 N. H. 597, 166 Atl. 64o (1933). A general discussion of constitutional aspects may be found in Note (1935)

13 N. Y. U. L. Q. 92.

Wash. Laws 1933 (Ex. Sess.) c. 7, § 13 (c). Italics supplied.
13. Levering and Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 71 F. (2d) 284 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert.
denied, 293 U. S. 595 (1934); Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union, 6 F.
Supp. 164 (E. D. Mich. 1934); Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v. Furniture Workers' Industrial
Union. 8 F. Supp. 209 (D. N. J. 1934); Dean v. Mayo, 8 F. Supp. 73 (W. D. La. 1934).
12.
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tween the appellant and a third party--a labor union that does not include
in its membership any employee of the appellant." '4
If anything may be determined from this rather obscure language, it would
seem that the Washington court's construction of the new anti-injunction act
revives the very doctrine of the Duplex case which the statute attempted to bury.
One can only speculate as to the results of the adoption of such an unhappy construction in other jurisdictions. In this regard it is imperative to note that the
Duplex case lent immediate sanction to a holding that where a strike was "terminated" by the employer's having filled the strikers' places, all picketing might be
enjoined as a "nuisance". This arresting conclusion ensued in the case of Dail
Overland Company v. Willys-Overland Inc.'s where the court stated that a striking employee was still an employee within the meaning of Section 20,16 but at
the same time concluded that this status was lost after the employer had resumed
the normal conduct of his business.' 7 Thus the applicability of the section, as
well as its counterpart in a number of states,'- was made to depend in large part
upon a judicial determination of the presence or absence of a strike. The implications of such a ratio decidendi were in due course fully realized in a number
where the court felt that
of cases granting an injunction against all picketing
9
some essential element of a strike was lacking.'
Should a similar series of cases follow under the construction of the recent
anti-injunction laws which the Washington court seems to have adopted, the result would be deplorable in the extreme. Although for a number of years courts
have issued drastic injunctions against picketing on the ground that no strike
existed,20 or that the existence of a strike had been falsely represented,2 ' there
14. 5i P. (2d) 372 at 379. Italics supplied.
15. 263 Fed. i71 (N. D. Ohio i9r9), afr'd, sub nor. Quinlivan v. Dail Overland, Inc.,

274 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 6th, 1921).
i6. 263 Fed. 171, 188 (N. D. Ohio, 1919).
17. Id. at 188, 192.

i8. These include ARiz. RE v. CODE (1928) § 4286; CAl.. GEN. LAWs (Deering, 1931)
Rnv. STAT. (i923) §6oAct i6o5, p. 718; IL. REV. STAT. (Cahill, i93) C. 22, § 58; KYA4.

iio7; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §4256; MONT. REv. CODE (Choate, i91i) § 9242 (8);
N. J. ComP. STAT. (Supp. 1925-1930) § IO7-I31a; OKLA. STAT. (931) § 10878; ORE. CODE
(930) § 49-902; UTAH REV. STAT. (I933) § 49-2-6; WAsH. REV. STAT. (Rem. 193) § 7612;
WIs. STAT. (i93i) § 133.07.
ig. Waitresses' Union Local No. 249 v. Benish Restaurant Co., 6 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A.
8th, 1925); Vonnegut Mchinery Co. v. Toledo Machine & Tool Co., 263 Fed. 192 (N. D.
Ohio, 1920). Under state statutes are such cases as Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers'
Club, 99 N. J. Eq. 770, 134 AtI. 309 (i926) ; Moreland Theater Corp. v. Portland Motion
Picture Machine Operators' Protective Union, i4o Ore. 35, 12 P. (2d) 333 (932).
20. This has been true even where there was no statute giving rise to the employeremployee restriction. Harvey v. Chapman, 226 Mass. 191, 115 N. E. 304 (1917) ; Stuyvesant
Lunch and Baking Corp. v. Reiner, IIO Misc. 357, i81 N. Y. Supp. 212 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff'd,
40 HARv. L. REv.
192 App. Div. 951, i8z N. Y. Supp. 953 (Ist Dep't i2o); Note (927)
896. It should be noted, however, that even without the compulsion of the recent anti-injunction legislation some courts have shown a disposition to abandon this rigorous attitude. E. g.,
Exchange Bakery and Restaurant, Inc. v. Rifkin, 245 N. Y. 260, 157 N. E. 130 (I927). In
the somewhat different problem of picketing where there is no question of a labor dispute,
See (i935) 83 U. OF PA. L. REv. 383.
this judicial attitude may be extremely important.
r
21. Collard v. Marshall [1892] i Ch. 57 ; Bolivian Panama Hat Co. v. Finkelstein, 127
Misc. 337, 2I5 N. Y. Supp. 399 (Sup. Ct. i925). There are indications that under the NorrisLaGuardia Act and its state counterparts courts may refuse to consider many allegations of
fraudulent misstatement of the existence of a strike. Apparently this will be true in spite
of a section in the model statute permitting an injunction where fraud appears. 47 STAT. 70,
§ 4 (e) (1932), 29 U. S. C. A. § io4 (e) (Supp. 1935). See Miller Parlor Furniture Co. v.
Furniture Workers' Industrial Union, 8 F. Supp. 209, 210 (D. N. J. 1934). With respect to
an allegation that pickets were fraudulently declaring an employer to be "unfair", one judge
said: "The very fact that it is a dispute indicates that there is disagreement and conflicting
views. The federal courts are prohibited from interfering with a full and free advertising
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seems to be no satisfactory test of what is a strike.2 2 True enough, it is almost
invariably declared that a strike consists of (i) the cessation of work, (2) by a
combination of workmen, (3) in order to enforce compliance with demands
made on the employer.23 But such language seems broad to the point of vacuity.
Moreover, it does not embody even an attempt to say when a once clearly existent
strike is terminated-often a most difficult question. Still further, the wide variety of legal problems to which application of this broad concept is attempted
tends increasingly to distort whatever meaning it may have. For instance, in
addition to its importance in relation to labor injunctions, the existence of a
"strike" may determine the legal relations of parties to a contract, or even the
penal liability of an employer under a criminal statute. A brief view of cases
dealing with these various legal problems makes an illuminating commentary
upon the adequacy of an abstract definition of a strike as a means of resolving
the lively issues of labor disputes.
Not infrequently contracts provide that the failure of a party to perform
may be excused if caused by a strike of his employees.2 4 In cases involving a
defense under such a clause, it would seem that a court need ordinarily look
for but three things: (i) an effective prevention of the defaulting party's performance by a cutting off of his supply of labor,2 (2) in such a fashion as to
have been the responsible cause of his failure to perform, 28 and (3) not resulting
from his own unreasonable conduct toward his employees. 21 Thus a tendency
to construe liberally the strike concept in this type of case is expectable. Viewed
in this light, the case of Smith v. Eagle Coal and Mercantile Co. 2s is significant.
Here it was held that a refusal to work for a mining company, because its
predecessor in the operation of a mine had failed to pay wages due, constituted
a "strike of employees". Although none of the men refusing to work had been
in the defendant's employ immediately prior to the refusal, the court avoided
the obvious bar of the generally accepted definition of a strike in the following
manner: 29
"Strikes have been spoken of as insurrections of labor. They have
proved an effective weapon in the hands of organized labor and stipulations
of the nature of that before us can be found in contracts the performance
of those conflicting views. I am of the opinion that the court in construing this statutory
provision cannot split hairs upon the question whether or not the plaintiffs are 'fair' or
,unfair' toward 'organized labor'." Cinderella Theater Co. v. Sign Writers' Local Union,

6 F. Supp. 164, 172 (E. D. Mich. 1934).

This plaint has been voiced already in Note (1927) 4o HAuv. L. REv. 896, 9oo.
23. Longshore Printing Company v. Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547 (1894) ; Reid,
What is a "Strike"? (1912) 32 CAN. L. T. 685; Note (Q927) 27 COL. L. REv. 190, 193; Note
(1922) 31 YALE L. J. 320, 322. Statutes making it criminal to strike under certain conditions
adopt the same general language. INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES INVESTIGATIoN ACT [REv. STAT.
22.

CAN.

(1927)

C. 112, § 2); INDUSTRIAL ARBITRATION AcT [9 N.

Act No. 17, § 5]; cf.,
§8-2 (a) (1927) ].

TRADE DISPUTES AND TRADE UNIoNs

So. WALES STAT. (i922)

Acr [17 & I& GEO. V, c.

22,

It is interesting to observe that, no doubt because of the inadequacy of the word
"strike", many contracts are now conditioned also on "labor troubles". But one case, at least,
held that such a phrase is merely explanative of the word "strike". Uden v. Schaefer, iio
Wash. 391, 395, 188 Pac. 395, 396 (192o).
25. Smith v. Eagle Coal & Mercantile Company, 170 Mo. App. 27, 155 S. W. 886 (1913) ;
Williams Bros. v. W. H. Berghuys Kolenhandel, 86 L. J. K. B. (N. s.) 334 (K. B. 1915).
26. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Jones & Adams Co., 232 Ill. 326, 83 N. E. 852 (19o8);
Stephens v. Harris, 57 L. J. Q. B. (N. S.) 203 (Ct. App. 1887).
27. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. v. Bowns, 58 N. Y. 573 0874); Hawkhurst S. S. Co. v. Keyser, 84 Fed. 693 (N. D. Fla. 2897); cf. Cuyamel Fruit Co. v. Johnson
Iron Works, 262 Fed. 387 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920).
28. 170 Mo. App. 27, 155 S. W. 886 (I913).
29. Id. at 36, 155 S. W. at 889. Italics supplied.
24.

NOTES
of which depends in part upon the cooperation of wage-earners. Considering the aims and purposes of the parties to the contract, the subject
matter, and phraseology of the whole instrument, 'we are coninced the
parties, regardless of the literal or most technical definition of the word
'strike', intended to use the word in its broader meaning of an insurrection
of labor."
Although perhaps doing violence to the abstract definition of a strike, this
but also warranted in the light
result seems to be not only entirely reasonable
8
it may be inferred that a
Thus,
"
liability.
contract
with
of other cases dealing
"refusal" to work, rather than a "cessation" of work, may be sufficient to invoke
the strike concept for the purposes of a defense to contract liability.
A similar liberal view has been taken in contract cases of the "demand"
element of a strike. For instance, in Williams Brothers V. W. H. Berghuys
Kolenhandel,31 where all available seamen refused to serve on a vessel whose
course lay.through submarine infested waters during the Great War, it was held
that a strike existed. It seems obvious that no demand upon the shipowner
could be tortured out of this very wholesome fear on the part of all the seamen
in port. Again, where an employer refuses to continue longer a particular wage
scale or trade practice, and his employees resist this change of policy by refusing
to work, a strike may none the less exist according to a number of contract
cases.3 2- In such a situation it is exceedingly difficult to visualize the passive
resistance of the employees as a "demand". Indeed, since the employer has
taken the initiative in bringing about the dispute culminating in the cessation
the label of "lockout" to
of work, it would seem slightly more accurate to attach
33
But again the general
the situation, were the problem purely one of logic.
desirability of a liberal construction for the purposes of determining contract
liability according to the intention of the parties, rather than according to overnice linguistic refinements, has prompted a more savory result.
With the foregoing cases, those in which the penal liability of an employer
depends upon the existence of a strike may be contrasted profitably. During
the continuance of a strike, the adversely affected employer naturally seeks to
replace the strikers with other workmen. But it often becomes impossible for
him to avail himself of the local labor market because of successful strike agitation, and hence he may advertise in distant places for new or" additional workmen. Where this happens, prospective workmen frequently invest considerable
time and money in answering the advertisement, only to discover upon arrival
at the job that a strike is in progress. In such a situation, the position of a union
sympathizer is not pleasant. Either he must "scab" at the expense of what he
conceives to be his own self respect and best interest,34or he must dumbly accept
the loss inflicted upon him by the employer's conduct.
3o. A very liberal construction is apparent in contract cases in which the meaning of a
strike clause is important. See Hawkhurst S. S. Co. v. Keyser, 84 Fed. 693 (N. D. Fla.
1897); Panzieri-Hogan Co. v. Bender, 2o5 App. Div. 398, 199 N. Y. Supp. 887 (3d Dep't
1923), aff'd, 237 N. Y. 553, 143 N. E. 739 (1923); Williams Bros. v. W. H. Berghuys KolenJhandel, 86 L. J.K. B. (N. s.) 334 (K. B. 915).
3. 86 L. J.K. B. (N. s.) 334 (K. B. 1915).
32. Hawkhurst Steamship Co. v. Keyser, 84 Fed. 693 (N. D. Fla. 1897); Delaware,
Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co. v. Bowns, 58 N. Y. 573 (1874) ; Panzieri-Hogan Co.
v. Bender, 205 App. Div. 398, 199 N. Y. Supp. 887, aff'd, 237 N. Y. 553, 143 N. E. 739 (1923).

33. See dissenting opinion, Penzieri-Hogan Co. v. Bender, 205 App. Div. 398, 406, 199
N. Y. Supp. 887, 894 (3d Dep't 1923).
34. A vivid portrayal of this may be ,found in the dissenting opinion, West Allis Foundry
Co. v. State, 186 Wis. 24, 34, 202 N. W. 302, 306 (1925).
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To remedy this situation, a number of state legislatures passed the type
of statute with which we are here concerned. 35 Typical is that of Massachusetts,
declaring: 31
"If an employer, during the continuance of a strike, lockout, or other labor
trouble among his employees advertises . . . or solicits . . . persons to

work for him to fill the places of strikers, he shall plainly and explicitly
mention that a strike, lockout, or other labor trouble exists among his
employees."
As may be expected, such legislation has been generally upheld as a constitutional exercise of the police power.3 7 But having leapt the barrier of constitutionality, these statutes apparently cannot hope to fare as well with judicial construction. In this connection a most illuminating case is Walter W. Qeflein Inc.
v. State. 38 Here, in a prosecution under such a statute, it appeared that three out
of ten men had quit the employer's service ten days after their union had by
letter informed the defendant that union men would work only eight hours a
day in the future, instead of the nine-and-one-half hour schedule maintained by
defendant. This letter was ignored by the employer. A conviction growing
out of these facts was reversed on the ground that there had never been a
strike, since there was no evidence of a "demand" made on the employer.3 9
Apparently the court felt the statement to the employer of the conditions upon
which the union men were willing to continue work did not measure up to the
"demand" element of the strike definition which it gleaned from two dictionaries.0
Of similar flavor is the result in West Allis Foundry Company v. State 4
where, immediately after ten men left their jobs, union picketing and advertising
of a strike was commenced. Three months later the employer advertised for
new employees. The court found that at that time the production in the employer's factory had reached its approximate norm, although picketing, payment
of strike benefits by the union, and union advertising of the existence of a strike
were still present. In addition it was obvious that the strike was still effective,
since the very men who answered the misleading advertisement refused to accept
employment when they discovered the true state of affairs. And yet, the court
felt justified in concluding that there was no strike-apparently because the
employer had succeeded in hiring a sufficient number of "strike breakers" to fill
the positions of the men who had actually gone out on strike.
Such a narrow construction of the strike concept as here applied may be
partially explained, perhaps, by the natural feeling of courts that criminal
statutes should be strictly construed. But from their very nature these statutes
are criminal rather in form than in substance. A number of them expressly
grant a civil right of action to the injured prospective employees. 41 Moreover,
the penalty attaching upon violation is in general quite light, even ridiculously
35. CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 4728, § I; COLo. STAT. (Courtright's Mills,
1930) § 4479; MAss. GEN. LAws (Terc. ed., 1932) C. 149, § 22; MONT. REV. CODE (Choate,
1921) § 11220; N. H. Laws (1926) c. 176, § 36; OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 10879; ORE.
CODE

(193o) §49-1OOl; TENN. CODE (Michie, 1932) § 11363; WIs. STAT. (1931) § 103.43.

36. MAss. GEN. LAws (Terc. ed., 1932) c. 149, § 22.

37. Comm. v. Libbey, 216 Mass. 356, lO3 N. E. 923 (1914); Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v.
Wryn, 70 Okla. 247, 174 Pac. 280 (1918). Contra: Josma v. Western Steel Car and Foundry
Co., 249 Ill. 5o8, 94 N. E. 945 (1911).
38. 177 Wis. 394, 188 N. W. 633 (1922).
39. Id. at 399, 188 N. W. at 635.
40. i86 Wis. 24, 2o2 N. W. 302 (1925).
41. MoNT. REV. CODE (Choate, 1923) § 11222; OKLA. STAT. (Harlow, 1931)
ORE. CODE (1930) § 49-1002; Ws. STAT. (1931) § 103.43 (3).
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so.4 2 Thus, in view of the very strong legislative policy involved, the term strike
ought to be broadly construed for the purposes of these statutes. Certainly the
necessity for a liberal construction is here present to as great an extent as it is in
cases involving purely contract liability.43
As has already been pointed out, where an injunction against labor activity
is sought a large number of decisions have been justified on the absence of a
strike. Of course, in many such situations there is actually no serious question
about this fact and hence no judicial definition of a strike is necessary.4 On
the other hand, there is a sufficient number of cases clearly involving a judicial
declaration as to the presence of a strike to provide material for an interesting
survey. Many of these cases seem to evince a strong judicial tendency to rely
on an extremely nice analysis. Thus in Gevas v. Greek Restaurant Workers
Club,45 on affidavit evidence which conflicted as to whether certain employees
left their jobs because of a call to strike or for other unascertained reasons, all
picketing was enjoined. Statements by pickets that a strike existed were styled
unlawful conduct, and said to be ground for a comprehensive injunction.4 6 This
case relied in large part upon the well known Massachusetts case of Harvey v.
Chapmlan4 7 where, again on affidavit evidence, a conflict arose as to whether
upon the union's call to strike any employees had left. Having found that none
did leave, the court proceeded to enjoin all picketing.48 Apparently these cases
rely on the "cessation of work" aspect of the generally accepted definition. Such
emphasis has resulted in lending judicial sanction to an employer's summarily
"discharging" employees who are about to go out on a strike so as to prevent
legal recognition of a strike's existence.4 9 Yet, where such is the case, it is an
odd spectacle indeed for a court of equity to extend its injunctive relief to the
employer."
Similarly, the necessary "combination" element of a strike, as judicially
construed, may often be a rocky shoal upon which union activity founders.
Thus, in a suit by an employer for an injunction against all union picketing, it
has been held categorically that strike by a single employee is a logical impossibility even though but one man was employed. 5 1 Such a view seems to carry
abstract reasoning a bit far; yet it apparently does not represent the extreme.
42. For instance, the California statute provides for a fine ranging from twenty-five to
two hundred and fifty dollars. CA. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) Act 4728, § 2.
43. Where by statute it is criminal for employees to strike in certain circumstances, there
are indications that a broad view of the term may be taken in order to effectuate the statutory
policy. In re Federated Moulders' Union, 15 A. R. 413 (N. So. Wales 1916).
44. Roraback v. Motion Picture Machine Operators Union, 140 Minn. 481, 168 N. W.
282 Mo. 3o4,

766 (1918) ; Hughes v. Kansas City Motion Picture Machine Operators Union,
221 S. W. 95 (1920).
45. 99 N. J. Eq. 770, 134 At. 3o9 (1926).
46. Id. at 786, 134 Atl. at 315.
47. 226 Mass. II, 115 N. E. 304 (1917).

48. The undesirability of deciding cases of this sort on the basis of such unreliable evidence as affidavit testimony need but be pointed out. See FRANKFURTER AND GaEENc, THE
LABOR INJUNCri N (1930)

66-81.

49. Resort is often had to this expedient. Densten Hair Co. v. United Leather Workers
International Union, 237 Mass. 199, 129 N. E. 450 (1921) ; Collard v. Marshall [1892] I Ch.
571. Such a move has been effective in defeating the employees' claim of the status of
strikers. Russell Hotel and Restaurant Co., Inc. v. Obermeier, N. Y. L. J., May io, 1924, at
583 (Sup. Ct.) ; W and H Coffee Pot Corp. v. Day, N. Y. L. J., July 17, 1926, at 1541 (Sup.

Ct.).

5o. The true nature of the discharge is readily apparent. Especially is this true where
it has taken place after a strike has been called but before the actual walkout. Here a court
would be hard put to find that no strike existed. See Densten Hair Co. v. United Leather
Workers International Union, 237 Mass. 199, 202, 129 N. E. 450, 451 (1921).
51. Moreland Theaters Corp. v. Portland Motion Picture Machine Operators Protective
Union, 140 Ore. 35, 12 P. (2d) 333 (1932).
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For instance, in Philip Henrici v. Alexander, 2 three unions, of which the defendant group was one, called a strike in the employer's restaurant in concert.
A substantial number of persons quit, but none of them were waitresses. In
this situation, the court partially based an injunction against all picketing on the
ground that no strike existed among the waitresses, and thus it had been unlawful for the Waitresses' Union to picket proclaiming a strike's existence.53
In common with the other strike ingredients, a "demand" made on the
employer may likewise be deemed strictly necessary for the legal existence of a
strike in labor injunction cases. Thus, in one case the absence of any "complaint" made by the employees before they left work was viewed as establishing
the lack of any demand on the employer. 54 Other slightly more intricate interpretations may in the same manner be judicially evolved. In some cases under
the Clayton Act, where the demand on the employer seemed unreasonable to
the court, it took the view that there was no strike.55 There is support in the
cases even for the proposition that a "genuine grievance" must be shown by employees quitting their jobs before legal recognition of a strike will be accorded. 56
In addition to this intricate initial problem of whether a strike has come
into existence, there is the more difficult one of when a once dearly existent
strike has ended. In the cases which the courts have had to treat from this
angle, a number of factors are mentioned as establishing a strike's definite termination. It is significant, perhaps, that no one of these has of itself been
deemed conclusive. They include, however, the filling of the strikers' places,5 7
the lapse of time after the initial walkout, 58 the resumption of normal output 5 5
the conduct of the men who have actually left their jobs, 0 and the support
accorded to the strike by the union organization involved. 6' Emphasis noticeably
has been placed upon the filling of the places of the men who have actually left
62
their jobs,

even where such a result accrued in large part from the court's own

prior intervention in the dispute. 3 Some danger would seem to lie ahead when
courts are impressed by a factor of this sort, in that strike breaking will be
stimulated.64 And even disregarding this practical consideration, it would still
52. 198 Ill. App. 568 (igi6).

53. Id. at 578.

54. Id. at 578, 579.
55. Vonnegut Machinery Co. v. Toledo Machine and Tool Co., 263 Fed. 192 (N. D. Ohio
292o) ; Columbus Heating and Ventilating Co. v. Pittsburgh Bldg. Trades Council, 17 F.
(2d) 8o6 (W. D. Pa. 1927).
56. Kraus v. Schachter, N. Y. L. J., July 17, 1924, 1370 (Sup. Ct.) ; Fifty Ninth StreetMadison Ave. Co. v. American Fed. of Musicians, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 23, 3926, 815 (Sup. Ct.).
57. Steinert v. Tagen, 207 Mass. 394, 93 N. E. 584 (1)
; Collard v. Marshall [1892]
i Ch. 571; see Berg Auto Trunk and Specialty Co., Inc. v. Wiener, 121 Misc. 796, 8oo, 2oo
N. Y. Supp. 745, 748 (Sup. Ct. 2923).
58. Waitresses Union Local No. 249 v. Benish Restaurant Co., 6 F. (2d) 568 (C. C. A.
8th, 1925); Dail Overland Co. v. Willys Overland, Inc., 263 Fed. 171 (N. D. Ohio
i919),
aff'd sub non., Quinlivan v. Dail Overland Co., 274 Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 6th, i92i) ; see Yates
Hotel Co., Inc. v. Meyers, 195 N. Y. Supp. 558, 562 (Sup. Ct. 1922).
59- Dail Overland Co. v. Willys Overland, Inc., supra note 58; Moore Drop Forging Co.
v. McCarthy, 243 Mass. 554, 137 N. E. 919 (1923).
6o. Steinert and Sons Co. v. Tagen, 207 Mass. 394, 93 N. E. 584 (1)
; Moore Drop
Forging Co. v. McCarthy, 243 Mass. 554, 137 N. E. gi9 (923) ; see Berg Auto Trunk and
Specialty Co., Inc. v. Wiener, 121 Misc. 796, 8oo, 200 N. Y. Supp. 748 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
6i. Steinert and Sons Co. v. Tagen; Moore Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy, both supra
note 6o.
62. Dail Overland Co. v. Willys Overland, Inc.; Moore Drop Forging Co. v. McCarthy,
both supra note 59; see Yates Hotel Co., Inc. v. Meyers, i95 N. Y. Supp. 558, 562 (Sup. Ct.
1922).

63. Dail Overland Co. v. Willys Overland, Inc., supra note 58.
64. Already strike breaking has reached the disgraceful proportions of a profession in
this country. See LEVINSON, I BREAK STRIKES (1935).
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seem shortsighted to allow an employer, by his own action, to prevent his former
workmen from claiming status as strikers. The fact that a court believes the
cause of the workmen to be lost is hardly a reason for declaring a strike to be
legally ended. Since to the layman the court's intervention might smack of
partisanship, there is serious danger that the dignity of the judiciary will suffer
in the public eye. Moreover, organized labor itself is in the best position to
know when it is futile longer to continue the struggle. As long as the interested
union continues picketing, the payment of strike benefits, and like activity, it
would seem wise to refrain from declaring a strike to be terminated.
Viewing the considerable number of labor injunctions which have been
ratiocinated on the ground that no actual strike existed, it is hard to believe, as
a practical matter, that courts really decide such vital issues on this basis alone.
It is beyond cavil that a judge's political and economic ideology may be a strong
factor, conscious or unconscious, in the decision of cases calling for the exercise
of discretion. 5 Unfortunately, legitimate labor activities have suffered because
of this.6 By depriving the judiciary of its power to exercise any discretion
over hotly contested economic disputes, it was hoped that anti-injunction laws
might remedy this situation. But, as in the case of the Clayton Act, the very
thing which made these statutes necessary, namely judicial preconceptions when
labor controversies arise, may substantially eviscerate them. Unless some change
of these preconceptions in labor cases is forthcoming, many statutory gains to
organized labor will remain illusory. Too often, in the past, have courts been
unable to see behind the individual employer's.present injury.6 7 As a result, the
more remote but far more significant injury to society engendered by low wages,
long hours, unwholesome housing conditions, and all their attendant evils, is rarely
accorded sufficient recognition. 68
S. S. G., Jr.
65. See CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF LEGAL SciENcE (1928) 5, 6I; FANK, LAW AND THE
MODERN MIND (1930) pt. I, c. 12; Radin, Theory of Jitdicial Decision: or How Judges
Think ('925) II A. B. A. J. 359.

66. This fact has led Frankfurter and Greene to conclude: "In dealing with these lively
issues, sterility and unconscious partisanship readily assume the subtle guise of legal principles." FaANKFUrTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION -(930) 46. Ex-Senator Pepper was merely voicing the same conviction, in a less bald form, when he said: "When you
observe attentively what is going on in a given community you will find it possible to decide
vhether in that community picketing has come to be recognized as the self protection of a
social class in striketime or is still generally regarded as something which can be successfully
outlawed in the warfare between employer and employee. . . . As long as the enlightened
sense of the community fails to recognize the difference between the self protection of an industrial class and mere wanton conspiracy to injure property and business, just so long judges
who have power in their hands are likely to use it when urged thereto by the owners of the
property and the business." Pepper, Injitowios in Labor Disputes (924) 49 A. B. A. REP.
174, 175, 177.
67. One explanation of this may be found in the language of Justice Holmes: "When
socialism first began to be talked about, the comfortable classes of the community were a
good deal frightened. I suspect that this fear has influenced judicial action both here and in
England. I think that something similar has lead people who no longer hope to control the
legislatures to look to the courts as expounders of the Constitutions, and that in some courts
new principles have been discovered outside the bodies of those instruments, which may be
generalized into the acceptance of the economic doctrines which prevailed about fifty years
ago, and a wholesale prohibition of what a tribunal of lawyerv, does not think about right.
I cannot but believe that if the iraining of lawyers lead them habitually to consider more
definitely and explicitly the social advantage on which the rule they lay down must be justified, they sometimes would hesitate where they are now confident, and see that really they are
taking sides upon debatable and often burning questions." HoLmES, CoLLECrED LEGAL PAPmS

184.
68. See WIrTE,

(1921)

THE GoVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932)

291-292.

